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I. Introduction 
What follows is an effort to focus attention on certain 
problem areas in the day-to-day administration of justice. 
They are problems not so much because of their complexity, 
but rather because uncertainty persists despite considerable 
discussion of the rules governing each area. I have selected 
preliminary hearings, bail, appointment of counsel, sua sponte 
judicial dismissals, and reasonable doubt as appropriate topics 
for this chapter. There are, of course, numerous others en-
titled to treatment, but each of those selected relates to a sub-
ject over which the trial judge may exercise an extremely broad 
discretion. The exercise of this discretion may alter the course 
of a criminal proceeding, and once exercised, is often beyond 
the reach of an appellate court. 
Since the exercise of discretion seems to infuriate those who 
would attribute worsening crime statistics to judicial leniency, 
it must be noted at the outset that the entire system, from the 
beat-patrolman through the prosecutor's office and on to the 
governor's pardoning power, is replete with discretion. This 
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is by design and merely signifies that no system of justice is in-
fallible. That is not to say that, in some instances, discretion 
is not exercised arbitrarily. Many of these are correctable 
at the reviewing court level. To the extent that they are not, 
the value of reposing discretion in our executive and judicial 
officers charged wtih the responsibility of enforcing criminal 
laws exceeds the harm done by a bad decision. 
In actuality, the discretion exercised by the courts pales into 
insignificance when compared with the discretion exercised 
by police officers in the field, who, for one reason or another, 
often despite probable cause, will decline to make an arrest, 
or that exercised by prosecutors, who, upon evaluating a police 
report, will decide that the evidence is insufficient to justify 
a prosecution and will decline to file a complaint. The differ-
ence lies in the accessibility of these discretionary decisions to 
the public view. The judge's statements are recorded by a 
court reporter and are frequently observed by the press. Ex-
cept for those rare cases attracting public attention, little is 
known and less is said about the manner in which the police 
and district attorney carry out their responsibilities on a case-
to-case or incident-to-incident basis. 
The fact that a prosecutor's office has an 85 percent convic-
tion rate is not an accurate measure of its effectiveness, since 
evaluation procedures have sifted out many of the tougher 
cases. Consequently, complaints are filed in those cases in 
which conviction is the foreseeable result. Even then, should 
further analysis suggest that the chances of conviction are less 
than first anticipated, the way is open to recommend a lesser 
plea or move for dismissal. Thus, conviction rates remain in-
tact despite rising crime statistics. Crime clearance rates col-
lected by local police departments may be just as misleading. 
This unreliability springs from the manner in which the 
original statistic is arrived at and the criteria for declaring a 
crime solved. 
In short, it is naive to assume that a system providing for as 
much discretion as ours can expect to dispense "equal jus-
tice under law." Approximate justice, perhaps, but never 
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hold, although our reviewing courts and, particularly, the Su-
preme Courts of California and the United States have insisted 
on the imposition of minimum constitutional standards, there-
by assuring relatively equivalent treatment. In recent years, 
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments of the Bill of Rights 
have been made applicable to the states, thereby closing a gap 
that had created some horrifying differences in the kind of due 
process a citizen of the United States could expect, depending 
on his geographical location at the time he was charged with 
a crime. 
The discussion that follows is not intended to imply that 
"equal justice under law" is an unworthy goal, or that judicial 
discretion in any of the areas referred to should be curtailed. 
The better conclusion is that a judge's failure to exercise dis-
cretion in an appropriate case undermines the independence 
of the judiciary and weakens the sinew of a free society by 
relinquishing judicial power to the executive. Concededly, 
judicial discretion must be exercised wisely and cautiously, 
keeping in mind that both protection of the community and 
justice for the individual are legitimate goals that provide 
an ethical basis for the administration of justice in a democ-
racy. 
II. Appointment of Counsel 
A. Objections to Appointment of Counsel 
Infrequently-but on occasion-a district attorney will 
object to the appointment of a public defender to represent a 
purportedly indigent accused. The danger of proceeding with 
a pro per defendant who has requested counsel is manifest, 
and the legal pitfalls are so numerous that the objection is 
a curious one. The prosecutor should be concerned with in-
sulating a potential conviction from any constitutional defect, 
but his objection to court-appointed counsel has the opposite 
effect. Moreover, the district attorney's standing to raise such 
an objection is doubtful, although he clearly has the right to 
present any information that is pertinent to a determination 
of indigency. 
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Government Code Section 27706 (a), provides that". . . 
[u ]pon request of the defendant [or] upon order of court 
[the public defender] shall defend, without expense to the de-
fendant, any person who is not financially able to employ 
counsel. ." A defendant may apply to the court, the 
public defender, or both for such services, and a determination 
by one that the defendant is ineligible is 'not binding on the 
other. Furthermore, a determination of eligibility by one is 
not reversible by the other.l Accordingly, the public defender 
is in a position to supersede a trial judge on this question, 
providing he does so in favor of representation. 
Intervention of the trial judge into an attorney-client re-
lationship is so unpalatable to the California Supreme Court 
that it would seem to follow that a district attorney's interfer-
ence would be considered even more undesirable. The nature 
of the attorney-client relationship is such that "once counsel 
is appointed or undertakes to represent an indigent defend-
ant, whether it be the public defender or a volunteer private 
attorney, the parties enter into an attorney-client relationship 
which is no less inviolable than if counsel had been retained. 
To hold otherwise would be to subject that relationship to 
an unwarranted and invidious discrimination arising merely 
from the poverty of the accused."2 
B. Determination of Indigency 
There is no precise formula for determining the financial 
eligiblity of a defendant for court-appointed counsel, and the 
California Supreme Court has recognized that a reviewing 
court should not prescribe a specific maximum amount of net 
liquid assets as a cutoff point. The appropriate test is "wheth-
er or not a private attorney would be interested in representing 
the defendant in his present economic circumstances."3 A 
1. Ingram v. Justice Court, 69 Cal.2d 
832, 73 Cal. Rptr. 410, 447 P.2d 650 
(1968). 
2. Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.2d 
547, 562, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1, 10, 440 P.2d 
65, 74 (1968); People v. Ferry, 237 Cal. 
App.2d 880, 890, 47 Cal. Rptr. 324, 
CAL LAW 1970 
332 (1965); Ingram v. Justice Court, 69 
Ca1.2d832, 840-841,73 Cal. Rptr. 410, 
414-415, 447 P.2d 650, 654, 655 (1968). 
3. In re Smiley, 66 Cal.2d 606, 620, 
58 Cal. Rptr. 579, 587, 427 P.2d 179, 
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determination of indigency is based on the defendant's over-all 
financial situation. Indebtedness must be weighed against 
assets, and the complexity of the case as well as the cost of 
legal representation in the community must be considered. 
In In re Smiley, the Court recognized that the inquiry of trial 
judges will normally "be a cursory one," and that as a practical 
matter, judges will be required to accept the defendant's own 
evaluation of his ability to retain private counse1. Should a 
judge's ambivalence on the subject lead to a hearing, a failure 
to consider outstanding indebtedness such as encumbrances 
on the home and automobile, number and age of defendants, 
child support and alimony, etc., would be error.4 Since con-
tingent fees are unethical, and few attorneys will accept em-
ployment on a credit basis in a criminal case, the ability of 
an accused to post bail or to resume his employment is not 
determinative of eligibility for court-appointed counse1.' 
C. Discharge of Appointed Counsel by Court 
Determinations of indigency aside, it is beyond the inherent 
power of a trial court to interfere with the attorney-client 
relationship by discharging a defendant's court-appointed 
counsel of record, over the attorney's and defendant's objec-
tions, on the ground of the judge's subjective opinion that the 
attorney is incompetent. Although a defendant has a con-
stitutional right to the effective aid of counsel, the trial court 
must neither infringe on the defendant's right to counsel of 
his choice nor compromise the independence of the Bar. The 
admission of an attorney to the Bar establishes his competence 
to practice in all state courtS.6 While the California Supreme 
Court acknowledges situations in which the trial judge could 
act sua sponte, such as illness, intoxication, or a nervous break-
down, such action "should be taken with great circumspection 
4. In re Smiley, 66 Cal.2d 606, 619, 
58 Cal. Rptr. 579, 587, 427 P.2d 179, 
187. 
S. People v. Ferry, 237 Cal. App. 2d 
880, 47 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1965); Williams 
v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. App. 2d 
614 
666, 38 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1964), citing 
13 Stanford L. Rev. 522. 
6. Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 
2d 547, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1, 440 P.2d 65 
(1968). 
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and only after all reasonable alternatives such as the granting 
of a continuance have been exhausted."7 
The supervening consideration in all such cases is "the 
State's duty to refrain from unreasonable interference with the 
individual's desire to defend himself in whatever manner he 
deems best, using every legitimate resource at his command."8 
"Incompetence," the Court holds, is not a legitimate basis for 
a trial judge to, on his own motion, relieve counsel, and "the 
recognition of such an authority would involve the surrender 
of a substantial amount of the independence of the Bar and 
in many instances would deprive litigants of a fair hearing."9 
D. Waiver of Counsel 
Extreme caution must be exercised in accepting a waiver 
of counsel from a defendant. As the above discussion would 
indicate, the trial judge has an obligation to determine whether 
indigency is the catalyst for the purported waiver. If so, the 
trial court must appoint counsel. The trial court's obligation 
exists even if the defendant is an attorney; the rights of in-
dividuals are not to be gauged by their professions or occupa-
tions.lO 
Doubts with respect to the right of a defendant to court-ap-
pointed counsel in all misdemeanor cases (including traffic 
offenses denominated misdemeanor) were set aside in the cases 
of In re Johnsonll and Blake v. Municipal Court.12 Article I, 
Section 13 of the California Constitution provides that in a 
criminal prosecution in any court whatsoever, defendants are 
guaranteed the right to counsel. In Johnson, the California 
Supreme Court emphasized that in determining whether a 
7. Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 
2d 547, 559, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9, 440 P. 
2d 65, 72-73. 
8. Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 
2d 547, 559, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9, 440 
P.2d 65, 73, quoting from People v. 
Crovedi, 65 Cal.2d 199, 206, 53 Cal. 
Rptr. 284, 289, 417 P.2d 868, 873. 
9. Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 
2d 547, 562, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1, 11, 440 
CAL LAW 1970 
P.2d 65, 75 (1968), quoting Gallagher v. 
Municipal Court, 31 Cal.2d 784, 797, 
192 P.2d 905, 914 (1948). 
10. Bogart v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 
2d 436, 34 Cal. Rptr. 850, 386 P.2d 
474 (1963). 
11. 62 Cal.2d 325, 42 Cal. Rptr. 228, 
398 P.2d 420 (1965). 
12. 242 Cal. App. 2d 731, 51 Cal. 
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defendant has effectively waived his right to an attorney, the 
usual presumptions against waiver of a constitutional right 
apply. The record must reflect an express and personal waiv-
er by the defendant demonstrating his full knowledge and 
recognition of the significance of his acts. Whether a trial 
judge permits a defendant to waive counsel is discretionary. 
but the trial court must perform its duty in a manner calculated 
"to promote rather than defeat the constitutional intent."13 
A determination of whether to accept a waiver hinges on 
the facts and circumstances of a particular case, the back-
ground, experience, and conduct of the defendant, and his 
understanding of the nature and effect of the waiver, the 
charge against him, and the pleas and defenses that may be 
available to him as well as the punishment that may be ex-
acted.14 
The Johnson opinion by Justice Mosk does not ignore the 
actuality of mass arraignments, such as in traffic court, where 
individually advising each defendant of his constitutional 
rights would hopelessly ensnarl the court calendar, but states 
that "although there may be a choice of valid ways to imple-
ment these rights," there can be no impairment thereof, how-
ever minor the crime.15 The clear conclusion to be drawn 
from the Johnson and Smiley cases is that, on appeal, review-
ing courts are apt to be result-oriented and will scrupulously 
examine purported waivers of constitutional rights whenever 
the defendant has been sentenced to a period of confinement, 
however short. 
This is borne out by the reasoning of Blake v. Municipal 
Court, wherein the defendant was convicted of violating Sec-
tion 22350 of the Vehicle Code for operating a vehicle at 53 
miles per hour in a 25-mile zone. A group of defendants, 
including Blake, had been advised collectively of their rights, 
including the right to court-appointed counsel if indigent. 
Blake pleaded guilty and was sentenced to one day in the 
13. 62 Cal.2d 325, 330, 42 Cal. Rptr. 15. 62 Cal.2d 325, 336, 42 Cal. Rptr. 
228, 231, 398 P.2d 420, 423 (1965). 228, 235, 398 P.2d 420, 427. 
14. In re Johnson, 62 Cal.2d 325, 42 
Cal. Rptr. 228, 398 P.2d 420. 
616 CAL LAW 1970 
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county jail. Holding the waiver ineffective, the Court of 
Appeals emphasized that where the assistance of counsel is a 
constitutional requisite, the right to be furnished counsel does 
not depend on a request. Accordingly, neither the defend-
ant's failure to make a request nor his entry of a guilty plea 
was determinative of waiver. Where a loss of liberty results 
from conviction, even for a a misdemeanor traffic offense, the 
record must affirmatively show that the defendant was notified 
of the right to counsel and that he expressly waived that right. 
A petition for hearing was subsequently denied by the Califor-
nia Supreme Coures 
E. The Right to Self-Representation 
"A defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to 
waive counsel and represent himself if he knowingly and 
intelligently elects to do so. ,,17 The determination of whether 
a defendant is competent to represent himself is discretionary 
and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse 
of discretion. IS Although the defendant's right to represent 
himself may not be denied on the sole basis that he is unable 
to "demonstrate either the acumen or the learning of a skilled 
lawyer," he must have a meaningful understanding of the 
nature of the offense charged against him, available pleas and 
defenses, potential punishments, and the consequences of a 
waiver. 
In the final analysis, a reading of the cases compels the con-
clusion that it is unwise for a trial judge, except in the case 
of an unusually intelligent and articulate defendant, to permit 
an accused charged with a serious crime to represent himself. 
As the California Supreme Court said in People v. Floyd, 
"Had the defendant like Milton . . . represented himself 
in a death penalty case, this court would have been required 
16. 242 Cal. App. 2d 731, 51 Cal. 
Rptr. 771 (1966). 
17. People v. Floyd, 1 Ca1.3d 694, 
702, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608, 612, 464 P.2d 
64, 68 (1970); People v Redmond, 71 
Cal.2d -, -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 529, 536, 
CAL LAW 1970 
457 P.2d 321, 328 (1969); People v. 
Maddox, 67 Cal.2d 647, 651, 63 Cal. 
Rptr. 371, 374,433 P.2d 163, 166. 
18. 1 Cal.3d 694, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608, 
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to reverse any conviction resulting from those proceedings, 
based on a fundamental denial of due process.,,19 
A trial judge having concluded that a defendant is com-
petent to appear in propria persona should not hesitate to 
reverse himself if, after observing the defendant in action, he 
becomes convinced that his original judgment was wrong. 
Not only would the continuation of the proceedings under such 
circumstances result in a denial of due process, but it would 
be disruptive of the judicial process. The California Supreme 
Court has stated that "the right to counsel may not be used 
to subvert the orderly and efficient administration of justice 
and that its utilization as a tool for dilatory purposes may not 
be permitted. It is equally true that the right to represent one-
self may not be used for such purposes.,,20 
Thus, a defendant has a right to represent himself subject to 
the trial court's constant duty to protect the judicial process 
from subversion, and the trial court possesses broad discretion 
not only in relation to the appointment of counsel to supersede 
the defendant in the conduct of his defense but also for ad-
visory or other limited purposes. "The right of an accused 
to represent himself with or without the assistance of counsel 
is not so absolute that it must be recognized when to do so 
would disrupt the business of the court or jeopardize a fair 
trial of the issues."l 
The reviewing courts view the intervention of a trial court in 
a self-representation situation differently from interference of 
the trial court in an existing attorney-client relationship. In 
the former situation, a determination of the defendant's com-
petence requires an assessment of his ability to conduct his 
own defense; in the latter, the attorney's competence is pre-
sumed by virtue of the fact he is licensed to practice in the 
State of California. 
If a defendant is deemed competent to represent himself, 
19. 1 Ca1.3d 694, 704,83 Cal. Rptr. 
608, 613, 464 P.2d 64, 69. 
20. People v. Powers, 256 Cal. App. 
2d 904, 914, 64 Cal. Rptr. 450, 457 
(1967). 
618 
1. People v. Powers, 256 Cal. App. 
2d 904, 915, 64 Cal. Rptr. 450, 458, 
quoting State v. White, 86 N.J. Super. 
410, 418-419, 207 A.2d 178, 183 
(1965). 
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he accepts the responsibilities "inherent in the role which he 
has undertaken," and a judge is not required to assist or advise 
the defendant on matters of law, evidence, or trial practice. a 
Nevertheless, in People v. Redmond, the California Su-
preme Court strongly urges trial judges to assist persons ap-
pearing in pro per: 
The primary goal of the effective administration of jus-
tice in this country is to assure that legal controversies are 
determined on the merits, and this goal is not furthered 
if a determination is based, not on the merits, but on the 
inabilities of a litigant, untrained in the law, who has 
chosen, perhaps unwisely, to represent himself and who 
is not fully conversant with legal procedures. It is in the 
highest tradition of American jurisprudence for the trial 
judge to assist a person who represents himself as to the 
presentation of evidence, the rules of substantive law, and 
legal procedure, and judges who undertake to assist, in 
order to assure that there is no miscarriage of justice due 
to litigants' shortcomings in representing themselves are 
to be highly commended.s 
The California Supreme Court ac~nowledges that, while en-
deavoring to assist a defendant, there may be cases in which 
a trial judge, acting in good faith, will give erroneous or mis-
leading advice. Such pitfalls are outweighed by the benefits 
to the administration of justice derived from assisting pro per 
defendants. The possibility of reversal "should not deter a 
trial judge from undertaking to assist those defendants to make 
sure that their innocence or guilt will be based on the merits 
and not on their inability to understand legal procedure.,,4 The 
clear implication of Redmond is that should a judge stand by 
and permit a defendant's ignorance of the law to interfere with 
a fair trial, a judgment of conviction will be reversed. (See 
also, People v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118,84 Cal. Rtpr. 156,465 
Z. People v. Redmond 71 Cal.2d -, 4. 71 Cal.2d -, -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 
-, 79 Cal. Rptr. 529, 536, 457 P.2d 529, 537, 457 P.2d 321, 329. 
321,328 (1969). 
3. 71 Cal.2d -, -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 
529, 536, 457 P.2d 321, 328. 
CAL LAW 1970 619 
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P .2d 44 (1970), decided by the Supreme Court after pre-
paration of this article. ) 
The trial court's inquiries on the subject of competency need 
not be prolonged, and a few questions may be enough to in-
dicate the defendant's inability to represent himself. "[T]he 
sufficiency of such an inquiry cannot be judged in a vacuum, 
without regard to the circumstances of the particular case.,,5 
In People v. Daniels, the accused, finding himself unable to 
effect a timely substitution of attorneys for his court-appointed 
counsel, was denied an alternative request to appear in propria 
persona. In his examination on competency, the trial judge 
inquired about the defendant's understanding of hearsay tes-
timony, exceptions to the hearsay rule, and peremptory chal-
lenges, and then expressed the opinion that since the defendant 
was not competent to represent himself a miscarriage of justice 
might result if he were permitted to do so. The California 
Supreme Court noted that a defendant's ignorance of impor-
tant rules of procedure or evidence will support an order deny-
ing permission to appear in pro per, and noted that a defend-
ant's right to counsel of his choice may not be abused by him 
for the purpose of delay. In Daniels, the defendant's request 
to represent himself was provoked by the trial court's refusal 
to delay proceedings while awaiting the arrival of an attorney 
selected by the defendant's father. The Supreme Court em-
phasized that the right to counsel must be protected against 
hasty and improvident waiver. 
Yet, the realities of the situation are such that "hasty and 
improvident waivers" are frequently accepted where minor 
or petty crimes, particularly traffic offenses, are charged. In 
In re Johnson, the California Supreme Court recognized that in 
traffic cases, the convenience of citizens, as well as the court, 
is served by mass arraignments: 
The vast majority of citizens haled into court on traffic 
violations share the judge's interest in prompt disposition 
of their cases, feeling themselves sufficiently inconven-
5. People v. Daniels 71 Cal.2d -, 
-, 80 Cal. Rptr. 897, 911-912, 459 
P.2d 225, 239-240 (1969). 
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ienced by having to make personal appearances in the 
first place. To require the judge to orally examine each 
such defendant at length for the purpose of determining 
his capability to defend himself would seem to be an idle 
and time-wasting ritual. Compliance with the spirit of 
the constitutional mandate that an intelligent waiver of 
counsel must affirmatively appear on the record may be 
officially achieved in such cases in a variety of acceptable 
ways.6 
But, as noted above, a caveat to the Johnson dictum is that 
the "variety of acceptable ways" is reduced by the imposition 
of a jail sentence. 
In Johnson, the California Supreme Court approved the 
procedure followed by the trial court in In re Sheridan, where-
in the defendants were informed by the trial court that even if 
they expressly waived counsel, "the court will then consider 
the nature of the charge, the facts and circumstances of the 
case . . . ,[ defendants'] apparent education, experience, 
mental competency and conduct to determine whether this is 
a proper waiver of [the] right to counsel. If, after considera-
tion of these matters, the court finds [a defendant competent] 
. ,it will permit [him] to proceed without counsel."7 
The underlying rationale for all trial judges to keep in mind 
when ruling on questions relating to the appointment of coun-
sel is well expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States 
in Glasser v. U.S.: "The right to have the assistance of counsel 
is too fundamental and absolute to allow CO!.lrts to indulge in 
nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from 
its denial,"8 and, as Justice Stewart asserted in a concurring 
opinion in Chapman v. California, "[t]hat, indeed, was the 
whole point in Gideon v. Wainwright."9 
6. 62 Cal.2d 325, 336, 42 Cal. Rptr. 8. 315 U.S. 60, 76, 86 L.Ed. 680, 
228, 235, 398 P.2d 420, 427 (1965). 702, 62 S.Ct. 457 (1942). 
7. 230 Cal. App.2d 365, 369,40 Cal. 9. 386 U.S. 18, 42, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 
Rptr. 894, 895 (1964). 721, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065, 
1083 (1967). 
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F. Responsibilities of Court-Appointed Counsel 
It is well established that court-appointed counsel, just as 
an attorney privately retained, has the power to control court 
proceedings on behalf of this client. He is an officer of the 
court and not a subservient helper of the defendant, and such 
an attorney must be permitted to act within the traditional and 
statutory status of his office. The California Supreme Court 
has repeatedly indorsed the proposition that the constitutional 
right to counsel does not include the right to an attorney who 
will conduct the defense of a case in accordance with the de-
fendant's whim. A difference of opinion over trial tactics does 
not entitle an indigent defendant to new counse1.10 In People 
v. Floyd, the California Supreme Court distinguished People v. 
Moss, wherein the Court of Appeals recognized a right to 
appointment of new counsel where "a legitimate difference 
of opinion develops between a defendant and his court-ap-
pointed counsel as to a fundamental trial tactic."ll The Court 
declined to rule on this point, since the request for new counsel 
in Floyd resulted from lack of confidence in his appointed 
counsel and not from a disagreement with trial tactics. 
Any attorney who represents a criminal defendant "owes to 
his client a duty to investigate carefully crucial defenses of fact 
that may be available, [and] the attorney's inexcusable failure 
to do so constitutes a denial of effective assistance of counsel 
and therefore a fair trial.,,12 Conversely, an attorney has 
no duty to offer testimony that is untrue, and counsel who 
knowingly offers perjured testimony is subject to criminal 
prosecution and disbarment.13 
A public defender who advises a client to enter a plea of 
10. People v. Floyd, 1 Ca1.3d 694, 83 
Cal. Rptr. 608, 464 P.2d 64 (1970); 
People v. Mattson, 51 Cal.2d 777, 336 
P.2d 937 (1959); People v. Nailor, 240 
Cal. App.2d 489, 49 Cal. Rptr. 616, 
(1967) cert. den., 385 U.S. 1030, 17 
L.Ed.2d 678, 87 S.Ct. 763; People v. 
Hill, 67 Cal.2d 105, 60 Cal. Rptr. 234, 
429 P.2d 586 (1967) cert. den., 389 
U.S. 1009, 19 L.Ed.2d 607, 88 S.Ct. 
572. 
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11. 253 Cal. App.2d 248, 250, 61 
Cal. Rptr. 107, 110 (1967). 
12. In re Branch, 70 Cal.2d 200, 210, 
74 Cal. Rptr. 238, 245, 449 P.2d 174, 
181 (1968); People v. Ibarra, 60 Ca1.2d 
460, 464, 34 Cal. Rptr.863, 386 P.2d 
487, 490 (1963). 
13. In re Branch, 70 Cal.2d 200, 74 
Cal. Rptr. 238, 449 P.2d 174 (1968). 
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guilty to forgery, despite appellate decisions precluding prose-
cution of credit-card offenses under the general forgery stat-
ute, is guilty of inexcusable neglect, and a conviction based on 
such a plea cannot stand. "A plea of guilty is more than a con-
fession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is 
itself a conviction; nothing more remains but to give judgment 
and determine punishment.,,14 By allowing his client to plead 
guilty, an attorney does not shift or avoid responsibility for 
conscientiously researching the facts and the law. "Depriva-
tion of the right to counsel at the pleading stage because of 
incompetence can well constitute a deprivation of due proc-
ess. ,,16 
G. Mental Health Act 
The new Mental Health Act (Welfare and Institutions Code 
Sections 5000 et seq.) provides inter alia for a 14-day involun-
tary commitment, if, after examination by the professional 
staff of a designated mental health facility, a person is found 
as a result of mental disorder, to be dangerous or gravely dis-
abled, and he has been advised of and has refused treatment. 
Along with a notice of certification, the person must be in-
formed of his legal right to judicial review by habeas corpus. 
He must be provided with an explanation of the meaning of 
habeas corpus and of his right to counsel, including court-ap-
pointed counsel. To implement these legal requirements, the 
Superior Court of San Diego County ordered the designated 
mental health facility in that county to admit the staff of a 
privately operated legal service for indigent persons to such 
facility to advise persons detained there of their legal rights. 
The San Diego Court, in its order, appointed the staff of 
"Defenders Inc." to visit all such patients, and to advise them 
of their rights. It also provided that if the facility did not 
comply, the court would automatically issue a writ of habeas 
14. In re Williams, 1 Cal.3d 168, 
175, 81 Cal. Rptr. 784, 789, 460 P.2d 
984, 989 (1969), quoting Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, -, 23 L.Ed.2d 
274, 279, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (1969). 
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175, 81 Cal. Rptr. 784, 789, 460 P.2d 
984, 989 (1969); In re Hawley, 67 Cal. 
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corpus to require all such persons being treated to be brought 
before the court. Representatives of the mental health facility 
sought prohibition, which was denied by the California Su-
preme Court. In upholding the order of the Superior Court, 
Justice Burke wrote that the trial court had acted within its 
jurisdiction in issuing the order, and he strongly implied that 
due process required it or an equivalent procedure: 
What is due process depends on circumstances. It varies 
with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation. 
Its content is a function of many variables, including the 
nature of the right affected, the degree of danger caused 
by the proscribed condition or activity and the availabil-
ity of prompt remedial measures.16 
III. Preliminary Hearings. 
A. In General 
It is a common complaint, despite pronouncements of re-
viewing courts to the contrary, that preliminary hearings are 
highly routine affairs in which the magistrate rubber-stamps 
the wishes of the district attorney. From time to time, there 
is talk of amending Article 1, Section 8 of the California Con-
stitution to eliminate the necessity for a preliminary hearing 
and permit the filing of complaints in the Superior Court in 
the same manner as complaints are lodged in the Municipal 
Court. The strongest argument in favor of this approach is 
that preliminary hearings are extra-baggage, conducted in per-
functory fashion by court and counsel. To the extent that this 
argument has validity, it is a product of the misuse or nonuse 
of the preliminary hearing to satisfy its two recognized objec-
tives: sifting the evidence and perpetuating testimony, or to 
satisfy a third purpose, which is judicially unrecognized, 
though important: pretrial discovery. 
For those intimately associated with the day-to-day ad-
ministration of justice, the passage of time has no meaning. 
16. Thorn v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 
3d 666, 673, 83 Cal. Rptr. 600, 605, 
464 P.2d 56, 61 (1970), quoting Sokol 
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v. P.U.C., 65 Cal.2d 247, 254, 53 Cal. 
Rptr. 673, 678, 418 P.2d 265, 270 
(1966). 
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With an increasing volume of cases, it makes little difference 
to the judge or prosecutor or the busy defense lawyer whether 
a case is tried in 30 days, six months, or a year. Matters 
are usually forgotten until they appear on the calendar; forgot-
ten, that is, by all except the defendant and his family, and 
perhaps the victim. 
The preliminary hearing represents a technique whereby a 
defendant may, at an early date after the filing of a complaint 
against him, have a kind of "mini-trial" that can result in dis-
missal or, at the very least, provide some insight respecting the 
substantiality of the charges, and permit him, if he wishes, 
to completely dispose of the matter at an early date by plea. 
The California Constitution and Penal Code mandate that the 
hearing be held promptly, and, excepting special circumstances 
such as physical incapacity of a witness, a prosecutor should 
not file unless he is prepared to proceed to a preliminary hear-
ing. Penal Code Section 860, provides that "[t]he magistrate 
must, immediately, after the appearance of counsel, or if, after 
waiting a reasonable time therefore, none appears, proceed 
to examine the case. . . ." It should be noted that it is 
the magistrate who is given the power to "examine the case," 
and the sound administration of justice requires that he do so 
at the earliest possible date. 
One reason for public dissatisfaction with the administra-
tion of our criminal laws is the prolonged delay between arrest 
and ultimate disposition of the case. A promptly held, proper-
ly conducted, preliminary hearing can in many instances serve 
as a catalyst for an early and final disposition either by dis-
missal or plea. The judiciary has an affirmative duty to see 
that criminal proceedings are expedited with due regard for 
the rights of a defendant to prepare his defense.17 In this 
connection, the magistrate must allow a reasonable time (at 
least two days) for a defendant to obtain counselor for as-
signed counsel to familiarize himself with the case. However, 
the indisposition of an essential witness, such as an uncon-
scious victim in a felonious assault case, might require a post-
ponement. Thus, "immediately," as used in Penal Code 
17. Penal Code § 1050. 
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Section 860, means "as soon as practicable," having due re-
gard for the nature and circumstances of the particular case. 
In setting a case for preliminary hearing, a court may consider 
the time required to subpoena witnesses, the incapacity of wit-
nesses to attend, and the availability of court time.18 
There is little justification for protracted delays in the hold-
ing of a preliminary hearing because if probable cause is lack-
ing, a defendant should not continue under the shadow of a 
criminal charge, and if probable cause is present, both the 
public interest and the rights of the defendant require a speedy 
trial. Judges and lawyers who are interested in improving 
the image of the profession and the courts will see to it that 
criminal matters are expeditiously processed without sacrific-
ing any essential right of a defendant. Delay, for the purpose 
of obstructing justice, is not a permissible tactic for either the 
prosecution or the defense; from the judicial standpoint, it is 
intolerable. 
B. The Purpose of a Preliminary Hearing 
The California Supreme Court has stated that a preliminary 
hearing is designed "to weed out groundless or unsupported 
charges of grave offenses, and to relieve the accused of the deg-
radation and expense of a criminal trial. Many an unjus-
tifiable prosecution is stopped at that point, where the lack of 
probable cause is clearly disclosed."19 
In Jennings v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court 
held that "to effectuate this constitutional and statutory pur-
pose, the defendant must be permitted, if he chooses, to elicit 
testimony or introduce testimony tending to overcome the 
prosecution's case or establish an affirmative defense."ao Ac-
cordingly, though pretrial discovery is not a recognized pur-
pose of the preliminary hearing, the effect of giving a defend-
18. People v. Maddox, 67 Cal.2d 775, 778 (1941); People v. Elliot, 54 
647, 63 Cal. Rptr. 371, 433 P2d 163; Cal.2d 498, 504, 6 Cal. Rptr. 753, 757, 
Ops. Atty Gen. 62-135, July 12, 1962 354 P.2d 225, 229 (1960). 
(1967). 20. 66 Cal.2d 867, 880, 59 Cal. Rptr. 
19. Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal.2d 146, 440, 449, 428 P.2d 304, 313 (1967). 
150, 114 P.2d 335, 338, 135 A.L.R. 
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ant the right to call witnesses on his own behalf, to cross-ex-
amine prosecution witnesses, and to establish an affirmative 
defense is to provide a discovery procedure. Although the 
reviewing courts will occasionally reject the theory that dis-
covery plays a role in a preliminary hearing, the magistrate 
cannot effectively curtail it, providing timely motions are 
made in advance of a hearing.l 
Often overlooked is the fact that the preliminary hearing is 
structured to allow for one of two possible results, a holding or 
a dismissal; and it is for the magistrate, not the district attor-
ney, to determine which is appropriate. Therefore, the magis-
strate must consider and weigh conflicts in testimony. He 
must judge the credibility of witnesses and consider the merits 
of an offered defense to determine whether it should operate 
to eliminate probable cause that might otherwise be present. 
C. Probable Cause 
The reviewing Courts have repeatedly held that reasonable 
or probable cause means: "Such a state of facts as would lead 
a man of ordinary caution or prudence to believe, and con-
scientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the 
accused. ".8 Later cases have added the word "conscientious" 
and have held that the magistrate must "conscientiously enter-
tain a strong suspicion of the accused's guilt."s The tendency 
of some trial courts, however, is to rely on the word "suspi-
cion" and to disregard the qualifying language. The distinc-
tion between a "suspicion" and a "strong suspicion" may be a 
subtle one, but, nonetheless, it can and must be measured 
in order to make the preliminary examination something more 
than a formality. If an accused can be committed on mere 
suspicion, then the preliminary examination might as well be 
1. People v. Superior Court, 264 Cal. 
App.2d 694, 699, 70 Cal. Rptr. 480, 
483 (1968). "There is no reason . . . 
to turn a preliminary examination into 
a discovery proceeding where the de-
fendant neither shows that he asked for 
statements made by him nor was re-
fused them." 
CAL LAW 1970 
2. People v. Nagle, 25 Cal.2d 216, 
222, 153 P.2d 344, 347 (1944). 
3. Bompensiero v. Superior Court, 
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dispensed with, since, as Justice Holmes wrote in United States 
v. Clark, "[w]hen suspicion is suggested, it is easily enter-
tained."4 
In Davis v. Superior Court, the Court of Appeal reviewed 
the applicable standard for determining whether there was rea-
sonable or probable cause, and stated that: 
The term "probable" has been defined to mean having 
more evidence for than against; supported by evidence 
which inclines the mind to believe, but leaves some room 
for doubt. . . . Such a state of facts as would lead a 
man of ordinary caution or prudence to believe and con-
scientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the 
accused.5 
In Garabedian v. Superior Court,6 the California Supreme 
Court reviewed the evidence adduced at a preliminary hearing 
for felony hit-and-run, and found that proof of mens rea was 
lacking: 
From the record, it appears that there was no evidence 
of an essential element of the crime with which petitioner 
was charged, to wit, knowledge on his part that an ac-
cident had occurred resulting in injury to another.7 
In Malleck v. Superior Court, the Court of Appeal issued a 
writ of prohibition restraining proceedings on an information 
charging an assault with a deadly weapon. After reviewing 
the preliminary hearing transcript, the Court held that: 
From the evidence at the preliminary examination, it is 
still as probable that the petitioner did not commit the 
crime as that he did. The term "probable" has been 
defined as meaning having more evidence for than 
against; supported by evidence which inclines the mind 
to believe, but leaves some room for doubt. . . . Ap-
plying the law to the facts adduced by the preliminary 
4. 200 u.s. 601, 609, 50 L.Ed 613, 6. 59 Ca1.2d 124, 127, 28 Cal. Rptr. 
617, 26 S.Ct. 340 (1906). 318, 320, 378 P.2d 590, 592 (1963). 
s. 175 Cal. App.2d 8, 22, 345 P.2d 7. Garabedian v. Superior Court, 59 
513,522 (1959). Cal.2d 124, 126,28 Cal. Rptr. 318, 320, 
378 P.2d 590, 592. 
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hearing, it is clear that there is no reasonable or probable 
cause to believe that the petitioner has committed the 
crime charged. Speculation and conjecture would have 
to be indulged in to connect the petitioner with the 
crime.s 
In Murphy v. Superior Court,9 the Court of Appeal re-
viewed the evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing at 
which the defendant was charged with assault with intent to 
commit murder, and granted a writ of prohibition holding that 
after disregarding extrajudicial statements of the accused, it 
could not find reasonable or probable cause to hold the de-
fendant to answer. The Court pointed out: 
. . . the extra-judicial statements of the accused can-
not be considered where there is no showing whatever 
that the victim incurred his injury by the act of a criminal 
agency sufficient to constitute a prima facie corpus delecti. 
. . . As pointed out in People v. Shuber, and as should 
have been abundantly evident here, conjecture and sur-
mise alone are no substitutes for competent evidence.1o 
(Emphasis added.) 
In Jennings v. Superior Court, the attorney general urged 
that the magistrate has only a perfunctory role at a preliminary 
hearing and that although cross-examination had been cur-
tailed and the opportunity to establish an affirmative defense 
denied, the evidence was nonetheless sufficient for a holding. 
The California Supreme Court replied: 
In this [contention], the People share a misconception 
of the trial court which pervaded the entire proceedings 
below, i.e., that as long as the prosecution's evidence 
showed probable cause to hold petitioner to answer it 
was irrelevant at that stage 'whether the man was, in fact, 
framed. . . .' If this view were correct, of course, any 
cross-examination or testimony on behalf of the defend-
8. 142 Cal. App.2d 396, 399, 298 10. Murphy v. Superior Court, 188 
P.2d 115, 117-118 (1956). Cal. App.2d 185, 188, 10 Cal. Rptr. 
9. 188 Cal. App.2d 185, 10 Cal. Rptr. 176, 177-178. 
176 (1961). 
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ant would become superfluous. To accept the people's 
argument would be in effect to erase sections 865 and 
866 from the books and reduce the preliminary hearing to 
an ex parte proceeding at which the defendant's presence 
would be a meaningless gesture.ll 
Much of the confusion over the magistrate's function at a 
preliminary hearing arises from the oft-repeated statement that 
the prosecution need not produce proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, but must only establish sufficient cause, that is, such 
evidence as would lead a man of ordinary caution or prudence 
to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of 
the guilt of the accused.12 But this does not mean that a 
magistrate should conclude the inquiry when the prosecu-
tion's proof achieves the level of probable cause. To the con-
trary, his function at the preliminary hearing is to judge the 
credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence: 
In conducting a preliminary hearing, the magistrate is 
required to pass upon the weight of the evidence and 
the credibility of witnesses in determining whether "suf-
ficient cause" has been established. IS 
Thus, the rule requiring less evidence at a preliminary hear-
ing than at trial does not suggest that the court should consider 
only one side of the case, but rather that if, after weighing the 
evidence, the court has probable cause to believe that a felony 
has been committed and that the defendant committed it, then 
the defendant should be held to answer. Questions of com-
petency, relevancy, and character of the evidence are not 
extraneous to a preliminary hearing. 14 
Moreover, probable cause must be based on legal and com-
petent evidence, and a magistrate cannot perform his function 
11. Jennings v. Superior Court, 66 
Cal.2d 867, 880,59 Cal. Rptr. 440, 448, 
428 P.2d 304, 312 (1967). 
12. Robison v. Superior Court, 49 
Cal.2d 186, 316 P.2d 1 (1957). 
13. People v. Akard, 215 Cal. App.2d 
182, 185, 30 Cal. Rptr. 69, 70 (1963); 
630 
Perry v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 276, 
283, 19 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5, 368 P.2d 529, 
533 (1962). 
14. In re Schuber, 68 Cal. App.2d 
424, 156 P.2d 944 (1945); People v. 
Schuber, 71 Cal. App.2d 773, 163 P.2d 
498 (1945). 
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properly if he permits the record to be cluttered with inadmis-
sible evidence. In order to justify a holding, competent evi-
dence respecting each element of the offense charged must be 
produced at the preliminary hearing, and the rule requiring 
prima facie evidence of corpus delecti before admitting extra-
judicial statements of the accused is applicable at preliminary 
hearing as well as at trial.15 
D. Perpetuation of Testimony 
It has long been recognized that the testimony of a witness 
at a preliminary hearing may, in the event of his unavailability 
at time of trial, be offered in evidence at the trial itself. Thus, 
counsel, in conducting a cross-examination, must keep in mind 
this possibility. Should the magistrate curtail cross-examina-
tion, the offer of a preliminary hearing transcript will probably 
be denied on Sixth Amendment grounds. In People v. Ben-
jamin,16 the sole witness against a defendant charged with 
strong-arm robbery was "unavailable" for trial. A transcript 
of this witness' preliminary hearing testimony was admitted 
against the defendant at the latter's jury trial, and he was con-
victed. The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, pointing 
out that defense counsel at the preliminary hearing was on 
notice that the witness might not be available for trial because 
of military service in Vietnam, and the defendant had "exten-
sively cross-examined" the witness at the preliminary hear-
ing.17 
The reasoning of the Court of Appeal in People v. Benjamin 
seems to conflict with both the rationale of the California Su-
preme Court in People v. Green18 and considerations of 
fundamental fairness. The "unavailable" witness in Benjamin 
was the sole identification witness, and there was no corrobora-
15. People v. Davidson, 227 Cal. 
App.2d 331, 38 Cal. Rptr. 660 (1964); 
Garabedian v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. 
2d 124, 28 Cal. Rptr. 318, 378 P.2d 
590 (1963); People v. Allison, 249 Cal. 
App.2d 653, 57 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1967); 
People v. Beasley, 250 Cal. App.2d 71, 
58 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1967). 
CAL LAW 1970 
16. 3 Cal. App.3d 687, 83 Cal. Rptr. 
764 (1970). 
17. People v. Benjamin, 3 Cal. App. 
3d 687, 695, 83 Cal. Rptr. 764, 767. 
18. 70 Cal.2d 654, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782, 
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tion for his testimony other than the defendant's acknowledg-
ment that he had been at the scene, a diner, at the time of 
the alleged robbery. The defendant was arrested approxi-
mately 15 minutes later, and none of the stolen property was 
found on his person. (See People v. Fortman, 4 Cal. App.3d 
495, - Cal. Rptr. - (1970), decided after preparation of 
this article, holding that an out-of-state witness subject to 
process under the Uniform Act is not "unavailable.") 
Barber v. Page,19 emphasizes the defendant's right to cross-
examine a witness in the presence of the trier of fact and rec-
ognizes the difference, in nature and purpose, between pre-
liminary hearings and trial proceedings, a difference that is 
bound to affect the quality of cross-examination. In Green, 
the California Supreme Court asserted that: 
[E]ven given the opportunity, neither prosecution nor 
defense is generally willing or able to fire all its guns 
at this early stage of the proceedings (the preliminary 
hearing), for considerations both of time and efficacy. 
Indeed, it is seldom that either party has had time for in-
vestigation to obtain possession of adequate information 
to pursue in-depth direct or cross-examination.20 
While "the right to confrontation is basically a trial right, it 
includes both the opportunity to cross-examine and the oc-
casion for the jury to view the demeanor of the witness. A 
preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less searching ex-
ploration into the merits of a case than a trial, simply because 
its function is the more limited one of determining whether 
probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial."l The re-
sult in Benjamin should, however, serve to remind counsel 
of what can happen and that Evidence Code Section 1291 
(a)(2) and Penal Code Section 686 permit the use of a pre-
liminary hearing transcript at trial in "unavailability" situa-
tions. Thus, the opportunity for cross-examination at the 
preliminary hearing may be the final one. 
19. 390 U.S. 719, 20 L.Ed.2d 255, 1. People v. Green, 70 Ca1.2d 654, 
88 S.Ct. 1318 (1968). 660, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782, 786, 451 P.2d 
20. 70 Cal.2d 654, 663, 75 Cal. Rptr. 422, 426. 
782, 788, 451 P.2d 422, 428 (1969). 
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IV. Bail 
A. In General 
It is ironic that the legal profession and legislators are 
in the midst of a debate on the subject of "preventive deten-
tion," after having so recently become accustomed to the prop-
osition that, whenever possible, defendants should be re-
leased without bail and upon their own recognizance. The 
policy favoring release is well stated by the American Bar As-
sociation Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice: 
"The law favors the release of defendants pending de-
termination of guilt or innocence. Deprivation of liberty 
pending trial is harsh and oppressive in that it subjects 
persons whose guilt has not yet been judicially estab-
lished to economic and psychological hardship, interferes 
with their ability to defend themselves and, in many 
cases, deprives their families of support. Moreover, the 
maintenance of jailed defendants and their families repre-
sents major public expense."2 
Yet, the advocates of "preventive detention" legislation con-
tend that existing O.R. and bail procedures release into the 
community hard-core criminals who will commit other crimes 
while awaiting trial on pending charges. 
Their argument is bolstered by the fact that there is, in 
most jurisdictions, a prolonged delay between arrest and trial, 
particularly in those cases in which the defendant is not in 
custody. Proposed preventive detention laws commonly au-
thorize confinement of unconvicted persons based upon their 
propensity to commit other offenses. Opponents of such leg-
islation assert that defendants are presumed to be innocent 
and that the effect of the presumption is destroyed by permit-
ting judges and prosecutors, prior to conviction, to engage 
in a hearing calculated to predict whether a defendant, once 
released, will commit other crimes. They argue, among other 
things, that the art of accurately predicting human behavior 
has not been mastered. Moreover, if the defendant is sub-
2. Standards Relating to Pre-trial Judicial Administration, March 1968, 
Release, Tentative Draft, Institute of p. 9. 
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sequently acquitted or the charges are dismissed, he will have 
been punished unjustly, and, if convicted, he will have been 
denied opportunities of participation in his own defense that 
are available to other defendants at liberty on bail or on 
their own recognizance.3 
B. Release on Bail 
In California, pretrial release on bail is governed by the 
provisions of Article I, Section 6 of the California Consti-
tution and by several Penal Code sections that implement 
the constitutional requirements.4 Prior to conviction, all per-
sons are entitled to bail as a matter of right,6 unless charged 
with a capital offense, in which event, a defendant "cannot be 
admitted to bail, when the proof of his guilt is evident or the 
presumption thereof great."6 Bail on appeal is discretionary 
if the defendant is convicted of a felony,7 but continues as a 
matter of right when the appeal is from a judgment imposing 
a fine or imprisonment in misdemeanor cases.s During the 
period between conviction (that is, a finding of guilt) and 
the filing of a notice of appeal, the defendant is subject to 
remand at the court's discretion in both felony and mis-
demeanor cases, and no right to bail exists during that period 
of time.9 
In setting bail, the court "shall take into consideration the 
seriousness of the offense charged, the previous criminal 
record of the defendant, and the probability of his appearing 
at the trial or the hearing of the case. ,,10 Since the sole pur-
pose of bail is to assure the presence of the accused at time 
of trial (and not to protect the community from future harm), 
California judges must not consider questions beyond those 
set forth in Penal Code section 1275. However, the amount 
3. For an excellent discussion of the 
subject see Alan Dershowitz, "Preven-
tive Detention," The New York Re-
view, March 13, 1969. 
4. See Penal Code §§ 1270-1276. 
5. Penal Code § 1271. 
6. Penal Code § 1270. 
634 
7. Penal Code § 1272(3). 
8. Penal Code § 1272 (1) and (2). 
9. Penal Code § 1129; Fricke and 
Alarcon, California Criminal Proce-
dure, 7th Ed. (1967) p. 68. 
10. Penal Code § 1275. 
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set after considering such factors is wholly discretionary. 
There is no reported decision holding that bail is excessive, 
although there are cases sustaining the bail set and holding 
that a defendant's inability to post bail is not, in itself, con-
trolling on the issue of excessiveness.ll 
Conscientious application of the requirements set forth in 
Penal Code section 1275, produce countless situations in 
which defendants are financially unable to post bail and thus 
must remain in custody. Consequently, some critics have 
suggested that our bail system hypocritically permits a form 
of "preventive detention," enabling the trial judge to employ 
a degree of sophistry in the setting of bail. It must be con-
ceded that there can be found, without difficulty, a plethora 
of cases in which the judge must have realized that he had 
set bail so high that the defendant would be unable to post 
it. Accordingly, the critics argue, let us drop the pose and 
adopt "preventive detention" legislation that will enable judges 
to do lawfully what they are now doing extra-legally. 
The argument is seductive, but probably without merit, 
unless inability to post bail is equivalent to unreasonable bail. 
For example, a judge arraigning a defendant charged with 
armed robbery must, in setting bail, presume the guilt of the 
defendant. III Penal Code section 1275 requires that the court 
take into consideration "the seriousness of the offense 
charged." The charge of armed robbery is serious and the 
penalties grave. Secondly, the trial court must consider "the 
previous criminal record of the defendant." It is frequently 
true that persons charged with a serious offense possess ag-
gravated criminal records. Finally, the trial court must con-
sider "the probability of his appearing at the trial or hearing 
of the case," and, here, the judge must balance the defendant's 
roots in the community, including his emotional stability, 
against the seriousness of the charge and his prior criminal 
record. Thus, by adhering to the requirements of Penal Code 
section 1275, the trial court may, without regard for the de-
11. In re Duncan, 54 Cal. 75 (1879); 
In re Smiley, 66 Cal.2d 606, 58 Cal. 
Rptr. 579, 427 P.2d 179 (1967). 
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fendant's potential to commit other crimes, conclude that high 
bail is required. 
Consequently, many persons charged with serious crimes, 
usually crimes of violence, find themselves held on such high 
bail that they are unable to post it, and the objectives of 
"preventive detention" are attained in a circuitous fashion. 
Thus, existing laws are accomplishing, in many of the more 
serious cases, what the advocates of "preventive detention" 
legislation argue is essential for the protection of the com-
munity. Whether the constitutional right to "reasonable 
bail" is compromised thereby is a separate question, but there 
is no California case that so holds. In any event, the need 
for such unique and potentially repressive legislation, even if 
constitutional, is not as apparent as the advocates suggest. 
Bail is sometimes too high because the magistrate does not 
have sufficient facts presented to him at the arraignment to 
make an intelligent determination. Although the inability 
of a defendant to post the bail set is not a legal basis for 
automatic reduction, it represents a relevant factor for a court 
to consider on an application to reduce baiJ.13 Similarly, the 
court is able to correct any initial misjudgments in the setting 
of low bail through its inherent power to increase bail when 
circumstances justifying such action are brought to its atten-
tion.14 
A 1962 Court of Appeal decision, Evans v. Municipal 
Court,15 has been cited for the proposition that "preventive 
detention" is approved under California law.16 Evans should 
be limited to its facts; a defendant had been denied bail for 
a period of 5t hours after his arrest on a drunk driving charge 
because he was too intoxicated during that period to care for 
himself or the safety of others. The case stands for the prop-
osition that a defendant need not be released from custody 
13. Penal Code § 1289 requires noti- 15. 207 Cal. App.2d 633, 24 Cal. 
fication to the district attorney in the Rptr. 633 (1962). 
event such a motion is made. 16. See Witkin, Cal. Crim. Proc. pp. 
14. This may be done without notice 143-144. 
to a defendant. Frankfort v. Superior 
Court, 71 Cal. App. 357, 235 P. 60 
(1925). 
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in an intoxicated condition, and he may be detained "either 
for the safety of the individual or for the protection of soci-
ety.,,17 A statement of the California Supreme Court in 1879 
on the subject of bail is nevertheless controlling: 
The sole purpose which should guide the Court or judge 
in fixing the amount of bail in any case in which bail is 
allowed should always be to secure the personal appear-
ance of the accused to answer the charge against him. 
It is not the intention of the law to punish an accused 
person by imprisoning him in advance of his trial. Such 
inhumanity or injustice as inflicting punishment upon 
him before his guilt has been ascertained by legal means, 
is not to be imputed to the system of law under which 
we live, and the provisions found in the American Con-
stitution, establishing the writ of habeas corpus, securing 
to accused persons imprisoned for felonies less than cap-
ital in degree the absolute right to be admitted to bail, 
and declaring that such bail should not be excessive, 
strikingly indicate the extreme jealousy with which the 
common law guards the personal liberty of the citizen 
from unwarrantable or unnecessary restraint.1s 
If bail is used for any other purpose, such as "preventive 
detention," it has, in the words of the President's Commission 
on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, "du-
bious legality.,,19 
C. Release on Own Recognizance (O.R.) 
The excellent experience of California courts with O.R. 
releases provides some indication of how unwise it would be 
to focus on the danger-potentiality of a defendant rather than 
upon the likelihood that he will appear for trial. Penal Code 
section 1318 authorizes "any court or magistrate who could 
release a defendant from custody upon his giving bail" to 
17. 207 Cal. App.2d 633, 636, 24 19. The Challenge of Crime in a 
Cal. Rptr. 633, 635 (1962). Free Society, p. 131. 
18. In re Duncan, 54 Cal. 75, 77 
(1879). 
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release a defendant upon his own recognizance. The only 
consistent opposition to release without bail has come from 
the bail bondsmen and their lobbyists. Me anwhjle , those 
directly connected with law enforcement and the administra-
tion of justice agree that the public interest is best served 
when a defendant with roots in the community is permitted 
to use his funds to pay legal fees and/or to support his family 
rather than to pay a bail bondsman. To set bail where the 
court is otherwise reasonably assured that the defendant will 
make his appearance is essentially punitive, and provides a 
subsidy for an industry that is not subject to the inhibitions 
and discipline ordinarily felt by those who participate in the 
administration of justice as officers of the court. As the 
California Supreme Court has pointed out: 
It cannot be argued that release on recognizance lacks 
meaningful sanctions: The statute requires the defend-
ant to file an agreement in writing promising to appear 
at all times and places ordered and waiving extradition 
if he fails to do so and is apprehended outside California 
. and makes willful failure to appear punishable 
as an independent crime. . Such an individual 
is not free to go where he will but is subject to "restraints 
not shared by the public generally.,,20 
O.R. procedures authorizing a police officer at his discre-
tion to release an arrested person either by having that person 
sign an O.R. agreementl or by issuing a citation accompanied 
by defendant's written promise to appear also greatly reduces 
the humiliation of the suspect and the cost to the state of 
housing him. 
Now that our criminal courts have become a clinic for the 
cure of most of society's ills, including all types of self-
destructive behavior as well as so-called victimless crimes, we 
can no longer distinguish between serious and minor offenses 
20. In re Smiley, 66 Ca1.2d 606, 613, 
58 Cal. Rptr. 579, 583, 427 P.2d 179, 
183 (1967); Penal Code §§ 1318, 
1319.4, 1319.6. 
1. Penal Code § 849(b)(3). 
638 
2. Penal Code § 853.6. The opera-
tion of citation procedures in Califor-
nia is discussed in "An Alternative to 
the Bail System; Penal Code § 853.6," 
18 Hast. L.J. 463 (1967). 
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by virtue of their classification as a felony or a misdemeanor. 
Numerous misdemeanor cases-battery, resisting arrest, fail-
ure to disperse, reckless driving, drunk driving, and sometimes 
even disorderly conduct-take on more serious manifestations 
vis-a.-vis society than, for example, the ordinary drug posses-
sion case. Likewise, many "bad check" cases, including most 
forgeries, rate as minor offenses when compared to certain 
crimes of violence now classified as misdemeanors. 
Thus, the mere labeling of a crime as a felony does not, in 
itself, justify the setting of high bail or a denial of an O.R. 
release. Countless alleged felony offenders are ex('p' ,cnt can-
didates for the O.R. program, while some persons charged 
with misdemeanors are not. Here again, the prime object of 
"preventive detention," keeping dangerous persons off the 
street, may be indirectly served by courts giving a literal con-
struction to section 1275, without regard to legislative classi-
fication of the offense charged. 
D. Conclusion 
In light of the broad discretion possessed by California 
judges and the reluctance of reviewing courts to tamper with 
bail set in the trial courts, it would be shortsighted to under-
mine existing constitutional requirements by enacting "pre-
ventive detention" legislation.3 
Most important, the California experience with O.R. re-
leases is too good to suffer the setback that would result from 
unnecessary emphasis on "preventive detention." Serious 
offenders are frequently held on high bail anyway, simply by 
applying the standards set forth in the Penal Code for the 
setting of bail, and those charged with capital offenses are 
not entitled to bail. On the other hand, a large percentage 
of persons arraigned for the first time are charged with mis-
3. In an early opinion the Supreme 
Court said: "In order to constitute it 
'excessive' it must be per se unreason-
ably great, and clearly disproportionate 
to the offense involved, or the peculiar 
circumstances appearing must show it 
to be so in the particular case." In re 
CAL LAW 1970 
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cording to Witkin, "This statement has 
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lower court." Witkin, Cal. Crim. 
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demeanor offenses, and of the remaining charged with a 
felony, a substantial number will have their charges reduced 
to a misdemeanor. A study conducted in San Francisco dis-
closed that 90 percent of arrested persons are charged with 
misdemeanors and, of the remaining 10 percent, 70 percent 
have charges either dropped completely or reduced to a mis-
demeanor. Applying this statistic statewide, it would seem 
that well over 90 percent of those who appear before a mag-
istrate are accused misdemeanants, and most of these are 
arrested for drunkenness, disturbing the peace, and other petty 
offenses.' 
A finding of the President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and the Administration of Justice is that one out of 
every three arrests in the United States is for public drunken-
ness, and in over 50 percent of all arrests, intoxication is a 
major factor.6 Thus, when we talk about dangerous offenders 
committing serious crimes while other cases are pending 
against them, we are talking about a very small percentage. 
It would be a mistake to build into our administration of 
justice a mechanism such as "preventive detention," which 
must inevitably affect minor as well as major offenders, and 
unnecessarily detain persons who represent, if anything, only 
a minimal threat to the community. 
To the extent that defendants afforded pretrial release are 
generating a lack of public confidence in our judicial system 
by committing additional offenses before their trial on the 
original charge, a cure should be found that is not worse 
than the disease. The most obvious solution is to revise our 
methods of calendar control and shorten the time between 
arrest and trial. In our society, crimes of violence must be 
given priority, and we should, in the words of the Presidential 
Commission, "provide an accelerated trial process for presum-
ably high-risk defendants."6 
4. See 18 Hast, LJ. 643, 652, su-
pra, for data. 
5. Challenge of Crime in a Free So-
ciety, p. 233. 
640 
6. Challenge of Crime in a Free So-
ciety, p. 131. F.B.I. uniform crime 
statistics for 1969 show crime of vio-
lence up 11 % over 1968. San Fran-
cisco Recorder 3/23/70. 
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This is certainly preferable to the exercise in prophecy 
required by the adoption of "preventive detention" legisla-
tion. The judicial time and investigative personnel required 
to process "preventive detention" hearings would be better 
utilized by bringing such defendants to an early trial and, 
if convicted, remanding them into custody. In this way, our 
judicial system could meet the legitimate criticism that has 
brought it into disrepute in recent years, and do so in a 
manner that would not prejudice a defendant's right to pre-
trial release. Effective implementation of the constitutional 
requirement of a speedy trial should satisfy the community's 
need for protection, and will eliminate the delay that both the 
prosecution and the defense so often strive to achieve. 
V. The Power of the Court To Dismiss a Criminal Case on Its 
Own Motion in Furtherance of Justice 
Penal Code section 1385, permits the court "either of its 
own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting at-
torney, and in furtherance of justice, [to] order an action to 
be dismissed." Although the language of the statute is un-
mistakably clear, it has suffered from judicial atrophy for two 
principal reasons: First, trial judges frequently lack sufficient 
facts upon which to base a sua sponte order for dismissal, 
and, second, when enough facts are available, reviewing 
courts, by permitting appeals in the guise of petition for writs 
of prohibition, and prosecutors by opposing such dismissals, 
have inhibited trial judges from acting on their own motion to 
dismiss criminal cases. 
In practical application, section 1385 has restored to the 
district attorney, de facto, the power of nolle prosequi that 
was presumably eliminated when section 1385 was enacted 
into law.7 A prosecutor's motion to dismiss an action in 
furtherance of justice on the grounds of "insufficiency of the 
evidence," "the unavailability of witnesses," or for a myriad 
7. See People v. Superior Court, 69 
Cal.2d 491, 72 Cal. Rptr. 330, 446 
P.2d 138 (1968). 
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of other reasons too numerous to list is usually controlling. 
Such a motion is most often made during the calling of a 
crowded criminal calendar, and the court routinely acquiesces 
without making independent inquiry into the facts. The 
procedure virtually eliminates any semblance of the judicial 
control and supervision over dismissal of pending criminal 
cases that must have been contemplated by the legislature 
when the statute was enacted, understandable in view of the 
large volume of criminal cases pending in the courts and the 
practical consequences of denying such a motion.s 
As early as 1887, the California Supreme Court defined 
the purpose of section 1385 as follows: 
The power under which the order was made is substan-
tially the same as that held by the attorney general in 
England, and by the prosecuting officer in many of the 
American states, to enter a nolle prosequi. The court, 
for the purposes of the order of dismissal, takes charge 
of the prosecution, and acts for the people. It holds 
the power to dismiss, as the attorney general in England 
holds the power to enter a nolle prosequi, by virtue of 
the office and the law; and it is exercised upon official 
responsibility. The court having acted for the people, 
and under express power granted by them to so act in 
their criminal prosecutions, there is no appeal on their 
part for such action.9 
In reviewing the scope of the common-law power of nolle 
prosequi, the California Supreme Court has noted that it "in-
cluded dismissal of the prosecution entirely or any separable 
part thereof," and that such an order could be entered by the 
Court on its own motion or that of the district attorney "before 
the jury was impanelled, while the case was before the jury, 
or after verdict."lo The California Supreme Court has, on 
8. See Penal Code § 1386. 649, 25 Cal. Rptr. 697, 699, 375 P.2d 
9. People v. More, 71 Cal. 546, 547, 641, 643 (1962) app. dismd. 374 US 
12 P. 631, 631-632 (1887). 494, 10 L.Ed.2d 1048, 83 S.Ct. 1912. 
10. People v. Sidener, 58 Ca1.2d 645, 
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several occasions, asserted that an order of dismissal pursuant 
to section 1385 may be entered even after the commencement 
of tria1.11 
Penal Code section 1238, defining the people's right of ap-
peal in criminal cases, was recently amended to authorize an 
appeal from an order of dismissal under section 1385, when-
ever such order is based on a defendant's motion to suppress, 
from an order of dismissal terminating the action before the 
defendant has been placed in jeopardy, or where the defend-
ant has waived jeopardy.12 Such an order is nonappealable 
when the dismissal occurs after commencement of trial, and 
mandate is also unavailable. 13 
In People v. Superior Court, supra, the defendant was 
convicted by a jury of armed robbery, whereupon the trial 
court, in lieu of granting defendant's motion for new trial, 
ordered the action dismissed pursuant to section 1385. The 
People petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the Supe-
rior Court to vacate its order, and the State Supreme Court 
denied the petition, holding, inter alia, that "to permit the 
People to resort to an extraordinary writ to review where 
there is no right to appeal would be to give the People the 
very appeal which the legislature has denied to them.,,14 
Noting that the People's right of appeal had been broadened 
recently by amendment of Penal Code section 1238, the Court 
stated that neither subdivision would have been applicable, 
since the order of dismissal was not based on a motion to 
11. People v. Alverson, 60 Cal.2d 
803, 807, 36 Cal. Rptr. 479, 482, 388 
P.2d 711, 714 (1964), "At any time 
during the trial, even after the defense 
has started;" People v. Polk, 61 Cal.2d 
217, 228, 37 Cal. Rptr. 753, 759, 390 
P.2d 641, 647 (1964), not subject to the 
limitation that the motion must be 
made before commencement of the de-
fense; People v. Holbrook, 45 Cal.2d 
228, 233, 288 P.2d 1, 3 (1955), dis-
missal after granting of a motion for 
new trial approved. 
12. Penal Code § 1238(7)(8). 
CAL LAW 1970 
13. People v. Superior Court, 69 
Cal.2d 491, 497-498, 501, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 330, 334-335, 337, 446 P.2d 
138, 142-143, 145 (1968); see also Peo-
ple v. Valenti, 49 Cal.2d 199, 207-
208, 316 P.2d 633, 637-638 (1957) 
overruled in 58 Cal.2d 645, 647, 25 
Cal. Rptr. 697, 698, 375 P.2d 641, 
642 (1962) app. dismd. 374 US 494, 
10 L.Ed.2d 1048, 83 S.Ct. 1912. 
14. 69 Cal.2d 491, 499, 72 Cal. 
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suppress, and because the defendant had been placed in jeop-
ardy and had not waived it. 1s 
The Court rejected the attorney general's argument that 
section 1385 does not confer power on the Court to dismiss 
over objection of the prosecution, and points out that such a 
contention "flies in the face of the very language of the sec-
tion."16 With respect to the power of the Court to dismiss 
after a jury verdict of guilty, it was held that "the discretion 
of the judge (to dismiss under 1385) is absolute except where 
the legislature has specifically curtailed it.,,17 
If anything, a court should have broader discretion to 
dismiss in furtherance of justice after the verdict than it 
should have during trial. After the verdict, the judge 
has heard the evidence of the prosecution; whereas prior 
to the conclusion of the trial there is always the pos-
sibility that in the absence of dismissal more evidence 
may be received. IS 
Finally, the high Court revealed its own philosophy respecting 
court-ordered dismissals and declined to restrict trial judges 
to cases in which the evidence was insufficient as a matter 
of law: 
If a trial judge is convinced that the only purpose to be 
served by a trial or a retrial is harrassment of the de-
fendant, he should be permitted to dismiss, notwith-
standing the fact that there is sufficient evidence of guilt, 
however weak, to sustain a conviction on appeal. The 
trial judge who has heard the evidence as in the instant 
case is in an excellent position to determine whether 
a retrial would further the interest of justice. The leg-
islature has given the trial court the power to dismiss 
under the broad standard of justice, and in view of the 
high caliber of our trial judges and their responsibility 
to the electorate, we believe that recognition of such 
15. 69 Cal.2d 491, 498, 72 Cal. Rptr. 17. 69 Cal.2d 491, 502, 72 Cal. 
330, 335, 446 P.2d 138, 143 Fn. 5. Rptr. 330, 337, 446 P.2d 138, 145. 
16. 69 Cal.2d 491, 501, 72 Cal. 18. 69 Ca1.2d 491, 503, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 330, 337, 446 P.2d 138, 145. Rptr. 330, 338, 446 P.2d 138, 146. 
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power in cases of conflicting evidence will not result in 
abuse but, to the contrary, believe that the due exercise 
of the power to dismiss in proper cases of conflicting 
evidence will further justice.l9 
Appropriate considerations for the trial court in determin-
ing whether to, on its own motion, order a dismissal pursuant 
to section 1385 after a guilty verdict are: a weighing of the 
evidence; the nature of the crime involved; the fact that the 
defendant has or has not been incarcerated while awaiting 
trial; the length of such incarceration; the possible harrass-
merit and burdens imposed on the defendant by a retrial; 
and the likelihood, if any, that additional evidence will be 
presented on a retrial. "When the balance falls clearly in 
favor of the defendant, a trial court not only may but should 
exercise the powers granted to him by the legislature and 
grant a dismissal in the interest of justice."ao 
VI. Reasonable Doubt 
The concept of "reasonable doubt" in a criminal case is 
an elusive one, difficult to define in meaningful terms or to 
distinguish from the "preponderance of evidence" rule ap-
plicable in civil cases. Mr. Justice Black has written that 
the term "reasonable" is "that irrepressible, vague and delu-
sive standard which at times threatens to engulf the entire 
law, including the Constitution itself, in a sea of judicial dis-
cretion."l It is paradoxical that our jurisprudence has seized 
upon "reasonable doubt" as the concept most likely to assure 
near certainty in the fixing of criminal responsibility. 
Jury arguments on the subject are often futile, particularly 
since the Court's charge is rendered relatively inflexible by 
virtue of the provisions of Penal Code sections 1096 and 
1096a. In 1964, this writer observed, in an article prepared 
for the Continuing Education of the Bar, that "whether the 
'reasonable doubt' requirement affords a criminal accused a 
19. 69 Cal.2d 491, 504, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 330, 339, 446 P.2d 138, 147. 
20. 69 Cal.2d 491, 505, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 330, 340, 446 P.2d 138, 148. 
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real advantage over a defendant in a civil case is an enigma. 
It is a mistake, indeed, for the defense lawyer in a criminal 
case to assume that it does."2 Since writing that article, six 
years have passed, almost five of which have been spent on 
the bench, but the enigma remains, and I question whether 
judges in their jury instructions or counsel during final argu-
ment meaningfully communicate to jurors the essence of the 
reasonable doubt requirement. 
Conversations with jurors suggest to me that many analyze 
the evidence and reach conclusions based on what amounts 
to a preponderance of the evidence and are satisfied to resolve 
evidentiary conflicts by asking whether there is more evidence 
for than against the proposition that a defendant is guilty. 
The "reasonable doubt" instructions most often resorted to 
by California judges create the visual impression of a slight 
"tilting of the scales," one way or the other. 
The distinction between the two burden-of-proof require-
ments can be clarified by an instruction that is given by some 
California judges, which expressly tells the jury that a pre-
ponderance of the evidence is insufficient to justify a convic-
tion: 
The rule of law in civil cases is different than the rule in 
criminal cases in this: In civil actions a jury may be 
authorized to find a verdict in accordance with a mere 
preponderance of the evidence but such is not the law 
in criminal cases. A bare preponderance of the evidence 
against the defendant which does not eliminate reason-
able doubt is not sufficient to warrant his conviction but 
on the trial of this and all criminal cases the guilt of the 
defendant must be established to the satisfaction of the 
jury to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt 
or he should be acquitted.s 
The shortcoming of this instruction is that much remains for 
the imagination, and, while implying that something more 
2. Goldstein, "Rules of Evidence In 3. Instruction given in Contra Costa 
Criminal Cases," California Criminal county. 
Law Practice, continuing Education of 
the Bar, p. 461 (1964). 
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than "a tipping of the scales" is required, it does not define 
that "something more" in quantitative terms that are useful 
to a jury in applying the definition of reasonable doubt set 
forth in Penal Code section 1096. 
The Third Circuit recently touched on the essential differ-
ence between the "preponderance of evidence" rule and the 
"reasonable doubt" requirement by pointing out that finding a 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt envisions a sub-
jective standard.4 While the key to implementation of the 
preponderance of evidence rule is a mere weighing of the 
evidence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral 
certainty requires not only a weighing of the evidence, but 
also employment of a value system [". an abiding 
conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge"5]. 
Thus, the significance of the reasonable doubt requirement 
to individual jurors and judges must necessarily depend on 
experience factors as related to and integrated with the ethical 
concepts of the individual trier of fact. 
Accordingly, opposite results-on the same facts-are pos-
sible, depending on the kind of jury selected or the person-
ality and philosophy of the trial judge. "Reasonable doubt" 
is premised upon the proposition that evidence may prepon-
derate in favor of guilt and yet be insufficient to compel a 
conviction. Although a weighing of the evidence may demon-
strate the probability that a defendant is guilty, a juror, heed-
ing the implications of moral certainty, might well have doubts 
that are founded upon reason. 
Even experienced appellate judges find the distinction a 
difficult one to make: 
When preponderance of the evidence of guilt is 
conceded, it seems to us difficult to say that the proof 
nonetheless falls short of the faint, fine and wavy line 
on one side of which the proof is beyond a reasonable 
doubt and to a moral certainty.s 
4. U.s. v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 
(1969) cert. den. 
S. See Penal Code § 1096. 
6. People v. Superior Court, 257 
CAL LAW 1970 
AC.A 47, 50, 64 Cal. Rptr. 572, 574 
(1967) hearing in Supreme Court 
granted, 69 Cal.2d 491, 72 Cal. Rptr. 
330, 446 P.2d 138 (1968), see also In 
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Yet, the difference is distinct, and the "faint, fine and wavy 
line" results from a legitimate effort to define "reasonable 
doubt" in such a way as to preclude jurors from believing it 
to be an insurmountable obstacle to conviction. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt requires "moral certain-
ity," and one acts "morally" when he conducts himself rightly 
or virtuously. When the word "moral" is used as an adjective 
to define a mental state such as "certainty," it suggests that 
there are ethical considerations implicit in a state of moral 
certainty. Thus, to be morally certain of something, one 
must have excluded all reasonable possibility of error. But, 
we do not instruct a jury in such terms. Instead, we say: 
The law does not require demonstration or that degree 
of proof which, excluding all possibility of error, pro-
duces absolute certainty, for such degree of proof is 
rarely possible. Moral certainty only is required, which 
is that degree of proof which produces conviction in an 
unprejudiced mind.7 
Why is it that we do not tell a jury affirmatively that to be 
morally certain it must exclude all reasonable possibility of 
error, rather than employ a semantic trick that states nega-
tively the most positive aspect of our criminal justice system 
and qualifies "reasonable doubt" to a point that makes it 
nearly indistinguishable from the "preponderance of evi-
dence" rule? Since Penal Code section 1096 (set fo~h in 
CALJIC 21 (Rev.)) provides that reasonable doubt "is not a 
mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human 
affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some 
possible or imaginary doubt," it is unnecessary to instruct 
368, 377, 90 S. ct. - (1970) wherein 
the U. S. Supreme Court rejects the 
suggestion of the New York Court of 
Appeal that there is only a "tenuous 
difference" between the two rules. 
7. CALJIC 22 (Rev.). Since the 
preparation of this article the third 
edition of CALJIC has been published. 
Although CALJIC 21 revised is set 
648 
forth in the new volume as CALJIC 
2.90, CALJIC 22 revised has been 
dropped. The Chairman of the 
CALJIC Committee, Superior Court 
Judge Arthur Alarcon, states the in-
struction was considered by the Com-
mittee to be argumentative and un-
necessary. 
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Junes that "moral certainty only is required"s (emphasis 
added) unless our purpose is to dilute the impact and reduce 
the sobering effect that the "reasonable doubt" instruction was 
calculated to have on persons-be they judge or jury-en-
trusted with the life, liberty, and reputation of individuals 
accused of crime. 
It is this observer's view that CALJIC 22 (Rev.), which 
purports to elaborate upon Penal Code section 1096, does the 
very thing that the "note" in CALJIC claims it does not do. 
That is, it curtails the quantum of proof required by Penal 
Code section 1096. Moreover, it undermines the ethical basis 
on which the term "moral certainty" is founded. Coming as 
it does on the heels of a statement that reasonable doubt is 
not an "imaginary doubt," CALJIC 22 implies, in rather 
strong terms, that the reasonable doubt requirement is not 
the high hurdle or "heavy burden" that our system of criminal 
justice intends it to be. Although a similar argument was 
made in People v. Kennelly,9 it was rejected by the Court of 
Appeals. Nevertheless, it does not appear that the Court 
considered the psychological impact of such qualifying lan-
guage upon a lay jury. (See footnote 7, supra.) 
The California Supreme Court has equated "moral cer-
tainty" with a "near certainty,"lO and has employed this quan-
titative standard to review convictions wherein it was 
contended on appeal that the evidence was insufficient as a 
matter of law. In People v. Redmond,!l the Supreme Court 
reversed a conviction based on the "identification" testimony 
of a victim who said only that the defendant's voice resembled 
her assailant's voice and that the expression in his eyes was 
similar. "Evidence," said the Court, "which merely raises a 
strong suspicion of the defendant's guilt is not sufficient to 
support a conviction. Suspicion is not evidence; it merely 
raises a possibility, and this is not a sufficient basis for an 
8. CADIC 22 (Rev.), dropped in 41 Cal. Rptr. 284, 396 P.2d 700 
CALJIC 3rd edition. (1964). 
9. People v. Kennelly, 166 Cal. 11. People v. Redmond, 71 Cal.2d 
App.2d 261, 332 P.2d 733 (1958). -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 529, 457 P.2d 321 
10. People v. Hall, 62 Cal.2d 104, (1969). 
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inference of fact. "12 Reaffirming principles announced earlier 
in People v. Bassett/3 the Court stated that in a criminal case, 
"the prosecution's burden is a heavy one; to justify a criminal 
conviction, the trier of fact must be reasonably persuaded to 
a near certainty. The trier must, therefore, have reasonably 
rejected all that undermines confidence.,,14 (Emphasis 
added. ) In reviewing the trial record Redmond, the Su-
preme Court gave credit only to "substantial" evidence, that 
is, evidence reasonably inspiring confidence and of solid 
value. In People v. Bassett,IS the Supreme Court catalogued 
cases in which the "substantial evidence" test had been applied 
by reviewing courts to justify reversal based on legally insuffi-
cient evidence. A reading of these cases and the reviewing 
courts' explanation for reversal provides a useful exercise for 
those seeking to appreciate the distinction between the reason-
able doubt and preponderance of the evidence rules. I6 
The potentially misleading effect of CALJIC 22 (Rev.) on 
jurors suggests that reevaluation is required. Future revisions 
should substantially incorporate the language of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Bassett. Phrases such as "near certain-
ty" and emphasis on the necessity for rejecting "all that under-
mines confidence" more nearly comport with our claim that 
the state assumes a "heavy burden" when it undertakes the 
prosecution of one of its citizens. (See footnote 7, supra). 
Although miscarriages of justice can result from even the 
12. 71 Cal.2d -, -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 
529, 534, 457 P.2d 321, 326. 
13. 69 Cal.2d 122, 139, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
193, 204, 443 P.2d 777, 788 (1968). 
14. 71 Cal.2d -, -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 
529, 534-535, 457 P.2d 321, 326-327 
(1969). 
15. 69 Cal.2d 122, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
193, 443 P.2d 777 (1968). 
16. See in addition to Redmond, 71 
Cal.2d -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 529, 457 P.2d 
321 (1969) and Bassett, 69 Cal.2d 122, 
70 Cal. Rptr. 193, 443 P.2d 777 
(1968), People v. Hall, 62 Cal.2d 104, 
41 Cal. Rptr. 284, 396 P.2d 700 
650 
(1964); People v. Gould, 54 Cal.2d 621, 
7 Cal. Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d865 
(1960); People v. Jackson, 238 Cal. 
App.2d 477, 47 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1965); 
People v. Singh, 11 Cal. App.2d 24, 53 
P.2d 403 (1936); People v. Jackson, 44 
Cal.2d 511, 282 P.2d 898 (1955); Peo-
ple v. Rodriquez, 186 Cal. App.2d 433, 
8 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1960); People v. 
Tatge, 219 Cal. App.2d 430, 33 Cal. 
Rptr. 323 (1963); People v. Tidmore, 
218 Cal. App.2d 716, 32 Cal. Rptr. 
444 (1963); People v. Ravel, 122 Cal. 
App.2d 312, 264 P.2d 610 (1953); 
People v. Alkow, 97 Cal. App.2d 797, 
218 P.2d 607 (1950). 
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most scrupulous adherence to the burden of proof require-
ment, "reasonable doubt" remains the doctrine that, more 
than any other, assures that innocent persons will not be 
wrongly convicted.I7 
17. The United States Supreme 
Court, in a decision handed down this 
term, has held that due process of law 
requires proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, in that the delinquency of a 
juvenile must be ascertained according 
to this standard, not by the preponder-
ance of evidence rule. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, says the Court, is 
"basic in our law and rightly one of 
the boasts of a free society." Its pur-
pose is "to safeguard men from dubious 
and unjust convictions" and "recognizes 
the fundamental principles that are 
deemed essential for the protection of 
life and liberty. The reasonable doubt 
standard plays a vital role in the 
American system of criminal procedure. 
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It is a prime instrument for reducing the 
risk of conviction resting on factual er-
ror. . . . The standard provides con-
crete substance for the presumption of 
innocence-that bedrock, axiomatic and 
elementary principle whose enforcement 
lies at the foundation of the admin-
istration of our criminal law. 
Due process requires that no man shall 
lose his liberty unless the government 
has borne the burden of . . . (prov-
ing his guilt and) therefore to this end 
the reasonable doubt standard is indis-
pensable for it impresses on the trier of 
fact the necessity of reaching a sub-
jective state of certitude on the facts in 
issue." In re Winship, supra, 25 L. Ed. 
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